Injunctive relief should be no more burdensome to
the defendants than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.
Madsen
v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc. 512 U.S. 753, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 129 L.Ed.
593 (1994).
Injunctions are classified as:
1) mandatory-prohibitory;
2) preventative-repairative-structural, and;
3) permanent-temporary.
Injunctions may be permanent, which means they have
been granted after a full-blown trial on the merits. Temporary injunctions
(TROs) are granted after a
brief hearing where evidence may be presented by affidavit. TROs may be
granted without a hearing or notice provided there is some exigent circumstance
or necessity. Prohibitive injunctions command a party to refrain from doing
something. Mandatory injunctions command a party to affirmatively do something.
The Duty To Obey Court Orders: Collateral Challenges
Must a court order of questionable constitutionality
be obeyed? An injunction which has been issued by a court of equity and
properly served must be obeyed no matter how erroneous the court was in
issuing it. Until that decision is reversed by an appellate court, the
injunction must be respected and violation of the order may be punished
as contempt. (U.S.
v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed.
884, (1947).) In Walker
et al. v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 87 S.Ct. 182, 18 L.Ed.2d
1210 (1967), civil rights activists who planned to march on Good Friday
and Easter were denied parade permits from the city. When they indicated
their intention to march anyway, Birmingham obtained an injunction from
a state court which ordered them to refrain from demonstrating. Marchers
who defied the order, including Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr., were arrested. The Court upheld the arrests
since the marchers failed to use proper judicial procedures to test the
injunction's validity. Even though, Justice
Stewart admitted, the injunction seemed broad and vague, and the marchers
may not have enjoyed due process when applying for the permit originally,
simply disobeying the injunction was not permitted. The general rule is
that an injunction that has been duly issued and served must be obeyed,
no matter how erroneous it may be.
The purpose of the preliminary injunction (also
called a Temporary Restraining Order [TRO]) is to maintain the status quo
between the litigants pending final determination of the case. United
Mine Workers (1947) 330 U.S. 258 affirmed the power of a court of equity
to issue an order to preserve the status quo in order to protect its ability
to render judgment in a case over which it might have jurisdiction.
Showing Required to Obtain a TRO Under F.R.C.P.
65
1) That unless the TRO issues, applicant will suffer
irreparable harm;
2) The hardship applicant will suffer outweighs
any hardship the defendants will suffer'
3) Applicants are likely to succeed on the merits;
4) Issuance of the order will cause no substantial
harm to the public and
5) Applicants have no adequate remedy at law.
Since a preliminary injunction or TRO can be granted
before a full hearing on the merits, F.R.C.P.
65(c) requires a bond in order to ensure that the plaintiff will be
able to pay all or at least some of the damages that the defendant incurs
from the preliminary injunction if it turns out to have been wrongfully
issued. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a party injured by the issuance
of an injunction later determined to be erroneous has no action for damages
in the absence of a bond. W.R.
Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, United Rubber Workers, 461 U.S.
757 (1983). State statutes may create express exceptions to the requirement
that a bond be posted. See, e.g., Cal.Code.Civ.Proc.
§ 529(b).
In Washington Capitols Basketball Club, Inc.
v. Barry, 304 F.Supp. 1193 (N.D.Cal., 1969) Rick Barry signed a contract
to play basketball for the Oakland Oaks. The Oaks were acquired by the
Washington Capitols. Barry then signed to play with the San Francisco Warriors.
The Capitols sought a preliminary injunction to prevent Barry from playing
basketball for any other team. The court ruled the Capitols were entitled
to the injunction (provided they could prove irreparable injury) in order
to maintain the status quo pending final determination of the case. The
court defined "status quo" to mean the last, peaceable, uncontested status
between the parties which preceded the present controversy and "irreparable
injury" as injury which is certain and great and which cannot be compensated
by the award of money damages.
Parties Bound by an Injunction
F.R.C.P
65 (d) provides that injunctions and restraining orders shall be "binding
only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants,
employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation
with them who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or
otherwise." A TRO or preliminary injunction is binding only on those "who
receive actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise." Successors
or assigns of persons bound by an injunction may also be bound in proper
cases. Golden
State Bottling Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 94 S.Ct. 414, 38 L.Ed.2d
388 (1973).
Decrees Affecting Third Parties
The remedial powers of courts do not extend to imposing
injunctive relief against a party found not to have violated the substantive
rights of another party. A party not subject to liability for violating
the law may not be assessed a proportionate share of the costs of implementing
a decree to assure nondiscriminatory practices on the part of another party
which was properly enjoined. General
Building Contractors Association, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375,
102 S.Ct. 3141, 73 L.Ed.2d 835 (1982). (But see, Hills
v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 96 S.Ct. 1538, 47 L.Ed.2d 792 (1976) [court
in desegregation case may extend injunctive belief beyond geographical
bounds where original discrimination took place].)
Modification of Injunctions
A court may modify a final judgment where the court
finds that "it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective
application." (F.R.C.P.
60(b).) Rufo
v. Inmates Of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 112 S.Ct. 748, 116
L.Ed.2d 867 (1992).
Statutory Injunctions
A statute may authorize injunctive relief even though
such relief would not have been available at common law. The statutory
authorization is a substitute for irreparable injury which is ordinarily
an indispensable requirement to the entitlement of injunctive relief. Although
a statute may authorize the issuance of injunctive relief, such statutes
are not normally interpreted to deny courts the discretion to rely on remedies
other than an immediate prohibitory injunction, even if the statutory threshold
showing is made. Weinberger
v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 102 S.Ct. 1798, 72 L.Ed. 91 (1982).
However, the legislative body may by explicit language or provision foreclose
the exercise of equitable discretion, so that injunctive relief is mandatory
if the evidentiary burden is met. TVA
v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
Injunctions Against Criminal Activity
Courts of equity will not ordinarily enjoin the
commission of a crime. The statutes themselves are standing injunctions.
But the mere fact that the act constituting a nuisance is also a crime
does not hinder the use of the civil processes to procure its abatement.
Cal.Civ.Code
§ 3369.It is a historic function of courts of equity to grant
preventative as well as remedial relief. If a statute specifically permits
the enjoining of a crime then courts of equity may do so without engaging
in the foregoing analysis. (See, e.g., Calif.Fam.Code
§ 6320 and Calif.Civ.Code
§ 527.8 [authorizing courts to enjoin domestic and workplace violence].)
Injunctions Against Litigation
The basic principle is that a court has a duty,
as well as power, to protect its jurisdiction over a controversy in order
to decree complete and final justice between the parties and may issue
an injunction for that purpose restraining proceedings in other courts.
However, state courts may not enjoin federal court litigation, (Donovan
v. City Of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 84 S.Ct. 1579, 12 L.Ed. 2d 409 (1964)
and federal courts are barred from enjoining proceedings in state courts.
(28 U.S.C. §
2283) Early in the history of our country a general rule was established
that state and federal courts would not interfere with or try to restrain
each other's proceedings. Nevertheless, there are statutory exceptions
to the prohibition enacted by Congress: (1) "except as expressly authorized
by Act of Congress"; (2) "where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction";
and (3) "to protect or effectuate its judgments." Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971).
Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety
or with respect to their separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to
be granted as a matter of course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional.
(Id.)
Child Custody Proceedings
When the parties to a divorce proceeding seek as
ancillary relief a child custody determination, the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) is applicable. Under
the UCCJA, once a court of this state learns of the pendency of another
proceeding, the court shall stay is own proceeding and communicate with
the court in which the other proceeding is pending to the end that the
issue may be litigated in the more appropriate forum and that information
be exchanged.
Extra Territorial Decrees
Although a court cannot convey title to land located
outside its jurisdiction it can order a person over whom it has personal
jurisdiction to convey the land. Fall
v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 30 S.Ct. 3, 54 L.Ed. 65 (1909). Federal courts
have the power to order a person subject to its jurisdiction to execute
a conveyance to land on pain of contempt. F.R.C.P.
70.
Injunctions Against Defamation
Generally, a defamed individual may not obtain injunctive
relief against threatened or continued defamation. Courts have traditionally
been reluctant to enjoin defamatory statements because of First Amendment
free speech considerations. (See, Near
v. State of Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931).
Furthermore, where public officials or public figures are involved, the
defamed plaintiff must prove that the false statements were made with "actual
malice" i.e., with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not. New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686,
(1964); Curtis
Publishing v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967).
Injunctions to Protect Privacy
In Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal.App.3d
409, 198 Cal.Rptr. 342 (1983), the National Enquirer published a story
allleging that Clint Eastwood
was involved in a "love triangle" with Sondra
Locke and Tanya Tucker. Eastwood
brought two causes of action, one for invasion of privacy and the other
based on Cal.Civ.Code
§ 3344, for misappropriation of his name and likeness for publicity.
Eastwood alleged that the Enquirer employed his name, photograph and likeness
on the front page of its paper and in related T.V. advertisements, without
his prior consent for the purpose of promoting sales of the Enquirer. The
court rejected the Enquirer's argument that a news account, even a false
one, is protected by the First Amendment and held that the First Amendment
does not immunize the Enquirer when the entire article is allegedly false.
Legal Remedies 101
