The United States Constitution (Article
III, Section 2) limits the exercise of the judicial power to 'cases'
and 'controversies.' The Declaratory Judgment Act in its limitation
to 'cases of actual controversy,' refers to the constitutional provision
and is operative only in respect to controversies which are such in the
constitutional sense. A justiciable controversy is thus distinguished
from a difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character; from
one that is academic or moot. The controversy must be definite and concrete,
touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.
It must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief
through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion
advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. Aetna
Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 57 S.Ct. 461, 81 L.Ed.
617 (1937). For adjudication of constitutional issues 'concrete legal
issues, presented in actual cases, not abstractions' are requisite.
The power of courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress
arises only when the interests of litigants require the use of the judicial
authority for their protection against actual interference. A hypothetical
threat is not enough. United
Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 67 S.Ct. 556, 91 L.Ed. 754
(1947).
Jurisdiction
The operation of the Declaratory Judgment
Act is procedural only. Relief under the Act is available only if
the requisites of jurisdiction, in the sense
of a federal right or diversity,
provide foundation for resort to the federal courts. The Declaratory Judgment
Act allowed relief to be given by way of recognizing the plaintiff's right
even though no immediate enforcement of it was asked. But the requirements
of jurisdiction - the limited subject matters which alone Congress had
authorized the District Courts to adjudicate - were not impliedly repealed
or modified. Skelly
Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 70 S.Ct. 876,
94 L.Ed. 1194 (1950).
Standards of Review
A federal district court should, in the exercise
of discretion, decline to exercise diversity jurisdiction over a declaratory
judgment action raising issues of state law when those same issues are
being presented contemporaneously to state courts. Provident
Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co., v. Patterson, 390 U.S.
102, 88 S.Ct. 733, 19 L.Ed. 2d 936 (1968).
Although Rule
57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits declaratory relief
although another adequate remedy exists, it should not be granted where
a special statutory proceeding has been provided. In cases where
a state criminal prosecution was begun prior to the federal suit, the same
equitable principles relevant to the propriety of an injunction
must be taken into consideration by federal district courts in determining
whether to issue a declaratory judgment, and that where an injunction would
be impermissible under these principles, declaratory relief should be denied
as well. Katzenbach
v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 85 S.Ct. 377, 13 L.Ed.2d 290 (1964).
Federal district courts possess discretion
in determining whether and when to entertain an action under the Declaratory
Judgment Act, even when the suit otherwise satisfies subject matter jurisdictional
prerequisites. District courts have substantial latitude in deciding
whether to stay or to dismiss a declaratory judgment suit in light of pending
state proceedings (and need not point to "exceptional circumstances" to
justify their actions). The Declaratory Judgment Act is "an
enabling Act, which confers a discretion on the courts rather than an absolute
right upon the litigant." Wilton
v. Seven Falls Co. 515 U.S. 277, 115 S.Ct. 2137, 132 L.Ed.2d 214 (1995).
The Declaratory Judgment Act states only that a court ămay declare the
rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration.ä
Where it is uncertain that declaratory relief will benefit the party alleging
injury, the court will normally refrain from exercising its equitable powers.
Legal Remedies 101