Part I
- Metaphilosophy
  - Philosophy is philos sophia, the "love" of, or attraction to, wisdom. The study of philosophy is thus the quest for, or pursuit of, wisdom. Wisdom in turn is the ability to discern the true from the false, the good from the bad; or at least the more true from the less true, the better from the worse; the ability, in short, to discern superior answers from inferior answers to any given question, be it a question of what is or a question of what ought to be.
  - Thus the ultimate practical aim of philosophy is a means of commensurability: a means of ranking the correctness of answers to various questions, about both what is and what ought to be. The superiority of a system of philosophy may thus be judged on the basis of its success at reaching this goal of commensurability. A perfect system of philosophy might not give the answer to every question, but it will always give a way, in principle, for any valid question to be answered.
  - There is however a set of specific questions which any complete system of philosophy must answer, for these questions concern the means of asking and answering all other questions:
    - To properly answer a question, we must first be able to ask it clearly and precisely; thus philosophy must answer questions regarding linguistic matters such as logic and semantics.
    - A system of philosophy must address the fundamental nature of the objects or world being asked about, answering questions about reality (concerning the world that is) and morality (concerning the world that ought to be); as well as the fundamental nature of the subjects or people doing the asking, answering questions about the mind (which philosophy directs to mirror reality) and the will (which philosophy directs to mirror morality).
    - Philosophy must of course address the methods useful to the end of answering our questions, as well as the institutions that are to utilize those methods; the means by which we attain knowledge and justice.
    - And finally philosophy must address the practical means of inspiring the use of such methods and the establishment of such institutions.
  - Any so-called philosophy which halts the quest for wisdom and fails to provide a means of commensurability is no philosophy at all, and may better be called phobos sophia, the "fear" of, or aversion to, wisdom. There are two categorical types of such phobosophy: the type whereby one holds that wisdom is unattainable, and it is therefore futile in the first place to seek it; and the type whereby one appeals to something arbitrary in order to prematurely claim that full wisdom has already been attained, where by arbitrary I mean to say that one could appeal to something different with just as much justification, and yet arrive at different answers, thus failing to conclusively answer anything.
  - In the following section I will examine two so-called philosophies, which I label nihilism and fundamentalism, that commit these respective errors.
- The Fundamentalist vs The Nihilist
  - The Fundamentalist says: Clearly, some things are good and others bad, some things are true and others false; but people disagree about which is which. The way to find out who is correct is by appealing to some authority on these issues, and the ultimate authority is God, who makes what's good, good, and what's true, true, by his word alone. This text here is the genuine word of God, and therefore to answer questions of true or false, good or bad, we must turn to the evidence in this text.
  - The Nihilist counters: Your claims of authority are suspect, supported only circularly by the very authority in question. Anyone else may claim the same degree of authority on the same basis, and yet disagree with you. There is no reason to think that your text is the word of God, or even that God exists, other than that your text says so; and there is no reason to accept what your text says other than it supposedly being the genuine word of God. Therefore we must conclude that there is in fact no God, and therefore no ultimate authority to appeal to, therefore there is no good or bad, no true or false; there are just differing opinions, all equally baseless, some merely more popular than others.
  - But the Nihilist is still buying into the Fundamentalist's whole system, and only attacking the keystone of it, bringing the whole system toppling down. And conversely, the Fundamentalist position in many ways collapses to the Nihilist's position with only the almighty God to give the Fundamentalist reason to think or act differently from the Nihilist (e.g. the Fundamentalist position that what is good equals what God commands, and that it is good because God will punish you for disobeying his commands, is ultimately a reduction to ethical egoism like that of the Nihilist). While the Nihilist is right to attack that keystone of divine authority, he does not go the extra step of attacking the fundamental design of the system which so depends on it. What we need is a new system which does not depend on the existence of an ultimate authority to separate good from bad and true from false.
  - True philosophy must concern itself not with who is or is not an authority on factual or normative matters, or even whether or not such an authority exists, because such concerns are irrelevant to philosophy. Instead, philosophy must concern itself with the methods of justification, comparison, and criticism of such claims; methods accessible, in principle, to anyone and everyone. In short, philosophy is concerned with the comparative examination of arguments purporting to support various claims.
- The Universalist vs The Relativist
  - The Universalist says: Moral universalism entails individualist liberalism, which in turn entails capitalism. Truth universalism entails rationalism(?), which in turn entails materialism.
  - The Relativist says: Moral relativism entails collectivist democracy, which in turn entails socialism. Truth relativism entails mysticism(?), which in turn entails idealism.
  - The Universalist and Relativist are both on the right track, rejecting authority, appealing to independent reason and the senses in descriptive arguments, and to the physical wellbeing of the common man in prescriptive arguments, but neither takes their starting principles to their logical conclusions, which are in fact the same. But both veer dangerously close to the pitfalls of the Fundamentalist and the Nihilist. (Each can go either way. TODO: flesh out how exactly. Universalist -> skeptic -> nihilist, Universalist -> foundationalist -> fundamentalist, Relativist -> noncognitivist(?) -> nihilist, Relativist -> 'socialist'(?) -> fundamentalist.)
  - If, as the capitalistic, liberal, moral universalist holds, property rights are absolute and inalienable, then every contract constitutes a morally invalid surrender of rights, and without contracts many of the classic institutions of capitalism become untenable, resulting in a sort of propertarian socialism. Similarly if, as the socialistic, democratic, moral relativist holds, it is wrong to impose your notions of morality on others, then majority rule is exactly the sort of might-makes-right imperialism they deride, and moral relativism collapses to an individualistic liberal anarchism.
  - Likewise, as materialism eschews the unwarranted notion of 'material substances' and turns to plain physicalism, and idealism eschews the equally unwarranted notion of 'mental substances' and turns to plain phenomenalism, the two converge into a physicalist phenomenalism or empirical realism like that of the logical positivists.
  - But what is the full and precise nature of this synthesis of universalism and relativism, and how may it be justified over the alternatives? That is the question which I will now attempt to answer.
- Axiomatization
  - Valid logical arguments can never contain anything in their conclusions that was not already contained in the premises. An argument merely demonstrates to the listener beyond a doubt that those things in the conclusion actually are in the premises.
  - Because of this it is impossible to have a logical argument about the most fundamental of premises, the axioms of one's philosophical system. Philosophical arguments are thus nothing but attempts to show that some set of axioms does or does not entail agreeable consequences.
  - Thus the only justification for philosophical axioms than one can offer is an extra-logical, pragmatic one; and the pragmatic justification which I offer for my axioms is commensurability. I intend to show in the following sections that the negation of any of my axioms leads to incommensurability; that is, to the inability to decide the superiority or inferiority of answers to some question.
  - Thus, while the negation of my axioms may in the broadest sense remain possible, inasmuch as I can offer no sound disproof of them, we cannot assume those negations without undermining our ability to make any philosophical, scientific, or social progress at all. Therefore, as a practical consideration, we must assume the axioms I will present in order for it to remain possible for us to make any progress in knowledge or justice whatsoever.

Part II

Logic and Semantics

Philosophy is fundamentally about how to ask and answer questions; to that end, it is about the clarification of our thoughts and speech; and to that end, it is about the development and application of logic and semantics; about figuring out what, precisely, we are asking, and thus, how to go about finding answers. To understand the meaning of a question is to understand how to check the answers. Thus if you know what an assertion connotes, you know in principle how to tell whether it is correct or not, and vice versa. Therefore, to build an adequate system of philosophy, we must begin with an adequate system of logic and semantics.
Notation
- All formulae in this system of logic are constructed by fuctions operating on lists, which may in turn be members of other lists. Whether these lists are treated as ordered or unordered depends upon the function operating upon them.
- A list is denoted as a series of members contained within parenthesis and separated by vertical bars. For example, the list containing x, y, and z is denoted (x|y|z). A list containing only one element is equivalent to that element simpliciter; for example, (P) is equivalent to just P.
- Any string of characters unbroken by whitespace immediately preceding a list denotes a function operating on that list, with the list members being the variables the function's value is dependent upon. For example, the function F operating on the list (x|y|z) is denoted F(x|y|z). A nullary function, or in other words a constant, is denoted simply by its name, in this example F, although formulations such as F() are also acceptable.

Junction

The Junction function of() serves as a sole sufficient truth-functional operator. of() is a binary function which operates on an ordered pair consisting of a number (or list of numbers) in the first argument, and any formula or list of formulae in the second; for example, the Junction function taking the number n for its first argument and the list (P|Q|R) as its second argument is denoted of(n|(P|Q|R)), and is spoken "n of [the following list]: P, Q, R". The value of the first argument determines the number of the variables from the list in the second argument which must be returned to satisfy the formula.
This single function, when operating on constants representing propositions, is thus capable of expressing all the formulae of standard propositional logic by itself, as well as many other formulae not expressable in standard propositional logic.

Notation	English Reading	Abbreviation
`of(0\|P)`	"None (or zero) of the following: P" "Not P" (negation, "NOT")	`not(P)`
`of(0\|(P\|Q\|R))`	"None (or zero) of the following: P, Q, R" "Neither P, nor Q, nor R" (joint denial, "NOR")	`none-of(P\|Q\|R)`
`not(none-of(P\|Q\|R))`	"Some (not none) of the following: P, Q, R" "Either P or Q or R" (disjunction, "OR")	`some-of(P\|Q\|R)`
`none-of(not(P)\|not(Q)\|not(R))`	"None (or zero) of the following: not-P, not-Q, not-R" "All of the following: P, Q, R" "P and Q and R" (conjunction, "AND")	`all-of(P\|Q\|R)`
`not(all-of(P\|Q\|R))`	"Not all of the following: P, Q, R" "Some (not none) of the following: not-P, not-Q, not-R". "Not-P or not-Q or not-R" (alternate denial, "NAND")	`nall-of(P\|Q\|R)`
`all-of(some-of(P\|R\|Q)\|nall-of(P\|Q\|R))`	"Some but not all of the following: P, Q, R" (exclusive disjunction, "XOR")	`xome-of(P\|Q\|R)`
`some-of(all-of(P\|R\|Q)\|none-of(P\|Q\|R))`	"Either all of none of the following: P, Q, R" (mutual implication, "IFF")	`aon-of(P\|Q\|R)`
`not(some-of(not(P)\|Q))`	"If P then Q", or "P only if Q", or "Q if P" "Not neither not-P nor Q", "Either Q or not-P" (material implication, "IF-THEN")	`if(P\|Q)`

Variables

The variable function for() serves as a sole sufficient "quantifier", in the sense in which that term is used in first-order predicate logic. for() is a trinary function which operates on an ordered triplet consisting of a number (or a list of numbers) in the first argument, a variable (or list of variables) in the second argument, and any formula (or list of formulae), normally involving the variable(s) from the second argument, in the third argument. For example, the variable function taking the number n for its first argument, the variable x for its second argument, and the formula F(x) for its third argument, is deonated for(n|x|F(x)), and is spoken "for n [values of] x, F(x)". The value of the first argument determines the number of values of the second argument for which the third argument satisfies the formula.
This function in conjunction with the junction function, when operating on formulae representing predicate functions and their objects, is thus capable of expressing all the formulae of first-order predicate logic by itself, as well as many other formulae not expressable in first-order predicate logic.

Notation	English Reading	Abbreviation
code>for(0\|x\|F(x))	"For no (zero) value of x, F(x)"	`for-no(x\|F(x))`
`for(0\|x\|(of(0\|F(x))`	"For no values of x, not F(x)" "For all values of x, F(x)"	`for-all(x\|F(x))`
`for(of(0\|0)\|x\|F(x))`	"For some (not zero) values of x, F(x)"	`for-some(x\|F(x))`

Context
- @(C|c|P) - "at context c, P", e.g. "at world w, P" or "at time t, P" or "at location l, P", etc.
- This function in conjunction with the preceding functions is thus capable of expressing all the formulae of standard modal logic, as well as many other formulae not expressable in standard modal logic.
Precision
- %(n|P) - "n*100% like P"
- This function in conjunction with the preceding functions is capable of expressing all the formulae of standard fuzzy logic.

Quantification

The quantification function designated being(n|F) describes a state of affairs wherein n things have the quality F. Such formulae do not by themselves express complete propositions, but are rather descriptions of states of affairs which could be asserted to be, commanded to be, or otherwise spoken about in formulae that do express complete propositions. Thus, these formulae read in English as incomplete sentences with gerund copulas, e.g. "[the state of affairs of] nothing being F" rather than the assertion that "nothing is F":

Notation	English Reading	Abbreviation
`being(0\|of(0\|F))`	"Everything being F"	`all-being(F)`
being(0\|F)	"Nothing being F"	`none-being(F)`
being(of(0\|0)\|F)	"Something (not nothing) being F"	`some-being(F)`

Qualification
- Quality functions may be constant/nullary ("F") or n-ary ("F(x|y|...|z)").
- Adjectives are simple constants (e.g. "nothing-being(foo)" = "nothing being foo").
- Verbs are gerund (e.g. "nothing-being(verbing)" = "nothing verbing") and are all at least unary. Adverbs are arguments for verbs (e.g. "moving(fast)" = "quickly moving"). Complex nouns with direct and indirect objects may take more arguments (e.g. "throwing(lazily|ball|Robert)" = "lazily throwing a ball to Robert")
- Nouns are complex adjectives (e.g. "is a-thing"/"is the-Thing"/"is Thing")
- The quality "void", indicated with an asterisk "*", reads as the adjective "nothing", as in the predicate "is nothing"; it is equivalent to the infinite joint denial of all qualities, and as such may be taken roughly to indicate non-existence, inasmuch as it indicates that that of which it is predicated has no qualities. Likewise, its negation "none-of(*)" reads as the adjective "something", as in the predicate "is something"; it is equivalent to the infinite disjunction of all qualities, and as such may be taken roughly to indicate existence, inasmuch as it indicates that that of which it is predicated has some qualities.
- The quality void is analogous to the quantity zero, and as such "being(0|*)" reads as "nothing being nothing" (i.e. zero quantity of things being void of all qualities), and "being(none-of(0)|none-of(*))" reads as "something being something" (i.e. a non-zero quantity of things being not void of all qualities)".
Mood
- (Incorporate most of this into metaphysics/metaethics instead?)
- Formulae using the above functions merely "paint a picture in words" - they describe a state of affairs, or some range of states of affairs, but they do not propose that it is so or that it be so; they are devoid of grammatical mood.
- Moodless formulae encode "ideas" - mental 'images' of states of affairs. Formulae with mood operators encode "opinions" - attitudes toward ideas. Opinions come in several different varieties:
- First we may distinguish between thoughts and feelings: feelings are non-reflective, subjective, phenomenal opinions (e.g. "I feel that X is/ought-to-be so; it just seems like that to me"), whereas thoughts are reflective, objectivized, universalized opinions (e.g. "I think that X is/ought-to-be so, and I'm right about that; thus everyone else should think likewise").
- Then we may distinguish between cognition and volition: a cognition is an opinion that something is the case, whereas a volition is an opinion that something ought to be the case.
- Combining these categories, we get perceptions (cognitive feelings), passions (volitional feelings), beliefs (cognitive thoughts), and intentions (volitional thoughts).
- Delving below feelings to the phenomena that arouse them, we find sensations (cognitive phenomena) and appetites (volitional phenomena). Likewise, rising above thoughts to the ideas they represent, we find concepts (things one could believe) and maxims (things one could intend).
- To add grammatical mood, we can use any of a series of eight mood functions differentiated by three criteria: indication/imperation (noted d/p), impression/expression (noted i/e), and proposition/inquisition (noted !/?).
- - di!(P) impresses a belief that P is so
  - de!(P) expresses a belief that P is so
  - pi!(P) impresses an intention that P be so
  - pe!(P) expresses an intention that P be so
  - di?(P) asks (impresses a request for a belief) whether P is so
  - de?(P) wonders (expresses a request for beliefs) whether P is so
  - pi?(P) asks (impresses a request for an intention) whether P ought to be so
  - pe?(P) wonders (expresses a request for intentions) whether P ought to be so
- By proposition/inquisition I mean to merely distinguish between statements and questions. A proposition is a thought being impressed, and a question is a request for impression of a thought.
- By expression/impression I mean to denote the difference between sentences whose function is merely to demonstrate the mental state of the speaker, and sentences whose function is to effect a change in the mental state of the listener. Assertions are impressive propositional sentences, or put another way, assertion is the speech act of impressing a thought.
- (c.f. Moore's Paradox: saying "P is true but I don't believe P" or "P is good but I don't intend P" is like screaming in a rage "I'M NOT ANGRY!" What you express by your statement performatively contradicts what you impress by it, so either you are lying, or simply incorrect, about your mental state, or you are pretending, or accidentally appearing, to have a different mental state than the one you really have. However, one may still perceive P and yet hold P to be false, or desire P and hold P to be bad, so long as one does not accept those perceptions and desires, which is to say, believe or intend their contents).
- By indication/imperation I mean to denote the "is"/"ought" or "fact"/"norm" distinction. All assertions express propositions, but "indicative" assertions (those denoted "di!") express factual propositions (that is, one proposes that something is some way, copula in the indicative mood) while "imperative" assertions (those denoted "pi!") express normative propositions (that is, one proposes that something be some way, copula in the imperative mood).

Objects - Reality and Morality
- Ontology, Alethology, or Metaphysics — and Teleology, Axiology, or Metaethics
  Regarding the objects of reality, 'substances', what factual sentences propose; and the objects of morality, 'ends', what normative sentences propose.
- Phenomenal Objectivism
  - The basis of comparison for opinions must be phenomenal to avoid the pitfalls of fundamentalism — meaning empirical, regarding perceptions or sensations, in the case of reality; or hedonistic, regarding passions or appetites, in the case of morality — as the very meaning of factual and normative propositions is grounded in cognitive and volitional phenomena, respectively, and thus nominally non-phenomenal opinions are effectively meaningless and thus incommensurable to begin with.
  - But though phenomena are to some extent inherently subjective, some notion of objectivity is necessary to avoid the pitfalls of nihilism, namely solipsism and egoism. Objectivity may be understood in a way reconcilable with phenomenalism as that toward which subjective opinion converges through the practice of the proper methods of opinion comparison (epistemological reason and deontological duty), the nature of which is to be established later.
- Translated into separate statements regarding factual and normative matters, this implies:
  - Empirical realism: What is true is just what seems to be true, and would seem so to anyone else as well. Loosely put, something is true if and only if an omniceptive (roughly "all seeing") empirically-inclined person would believe it. A substance is just a bundle of attributes, so attributes cannot "represent" substances as there is no distinction between them.
  - Hedonistic moralism: What is good is just what seesm to be good, and would seem so to anyone else as well. Loosely put, something is good if and only if an omnipathic (roughly "all feeling") hedonistically-inclined person would intend it. A means is just a bundle of ends, so ends cannot "justify" means as there is no distinction between them.
Subjects - The Mind and the Will
- Mind and Will.
- "Functional Subjectivism"
- Given the above empirical realism, the concept of a "supernatural" subject or agent is meaningless and thus void. So we must look elsewhere for our notions of the mind and the will: they must somehow be products or functions of physical systems.
- But clearly something also has subjective, so-called "phenomenal consciousness", which is just what it's like to be acted upon, to be a subject of experience; and "phenomenal willpower", which is just what it's like to be disposed to act, to be in some way motivated. If nothing else does, I clearly do. But what of everything else? Either everything besides me also has such mental attributes, or only things sufficiently like me do. The latter requires an arbitrary line to be drawn somewhere, and leads thus to fundamentalist incommensurability. We must thus conclude the former: that everything is a subject of "experience" with its own internal "motives", however simplistic they may be.
- Sensation and appetition, perception and passion, are the phenomenal experiences of certain complex functional systems. An entity with these functional attributes may rightly be called sentient.
- Real, functional consciousness and willpower are just reflexive versions of perception and passion: having beliefs about what you believe and intentions about what you intend. An entity with these functional attributes may rightly be called sapient or a person.
Methods - Knowledge and Justice
- Epistemology - regarding the methods of knowledge and reason, comparing and contrasting concepts and beliefs with the aim of objective truth.
- Deontology - regarding the methods of justice and duty, comparing and contrasting maxims and intentions with the aim of objective goodness.
- "Criticoliberalism":
- (Critical epistemology and Liberal deontology):
- Evidentialism leads to the problem of infinite regress, which leads ultimately to skepticism, which leads to effective nihilism. Fideism likewise leads straight to fundamentalism. The solution is a liberal yet critical approach, both for epistemological purposes (justification of beliefs) and deontological purposes (justification of intentions): liberal to circumvent the problem of infinite regress, and critical to circumvent the problem of fideistic irrationality.
- You do not need to justify your beliefs or intentions to yourself; you are free to hold them non-rationally, for no reason; but only for as long as they can withstand rational criticism, that is, so long as there is also no reason contrary. (To justify your beliefs or intentions to another person - to get them to agree with you - you need only appeal to some common ground between you, and the 'depth' of this foundation may be arbitrary and may vary between dialectic partners.)
- Concepts and maxims, the objects of the consideration of reason and duty respectively, derive from conception and compassion. That is to say, abstraction from one's present beliefs and intentions to what is universally possible or permissible. Loosely speaking, something is possible if and only if some omniceptive person could believe it; and likewise, something is permissible if and only if some omnipathic person could intend it.
- "Something is, and ought to be" - By default, only the universal disjunction ("P or not P or Q or not Q or R or not R...") must be taken to be true and good. Something is true; something is good. I exist, and I ought to; the world exists, and it ought to.
- "Nothing is that is not, or ought to be that ought not to be" - The principles of consistency (or non-contradiction) and reciprocity (or non-hypocricy). As experience weeds out possibilities, progressively fewer and fewer nigh-universal disjunctions remain possible or permissible, narrowing in (by negating disjuncts and thus affirming their negations) on the one conjunction which is perfectly true, the one conjunction which is perfectly good.
- "And that's final." - The effects which definitions and contracts can have on necessity and obligation are highly limited; neccesary truths and obligatory goods are only so given some assigned meaning of words and some assigned ownership of property. Definitions can change the meaning of words, and contracts can change the ownership of property, but that is it; purely formal necessity and obligation, independent of or meaning or ownership, cannot be changed by definition or contract, respectively.
- (Causal theory of reference mirrors historical theory of ownership. Terms and properties must have a history of justified acquisition and transfer of referents and owners, respectively, in order for their present nominal referents and owners to be legitimately so, and thus the necessities and obligations depending on such meaning and ownership to be legitimate. [Though perhaps there is some 'statute of limitations'?] Also: All truths regarding particular individuals are necessary truths in virtue of the reference of one's name, and all goods regarding particular individuals are obligatory in virtue of the ownership of oneself).
- "With one caveat..." - We can't think nothing or do nothing; we must have current best working theories and strategies. In dealing with imperfection, sometimes you have to use a theory known to make some false predictions because of all theories yet considered that one is the best; and sometimes you have to act upon a strategy known to have bad consequences because of all strategies yet considered that one is the best. This doesn't mean accepting the false things as true or the bad things as good; it just means dealing with the false predictions or bad consequences because there's no way apparent to avoid the falsity or badness without incurring even more falsity and badness. In short, when only evils are available, the least evil option is the best. (Define "least evil" in terms of minimax? Or "let justice be done [by me at least] though the heavens fall"? Both somehow?)
Institutes - Religion and Politics
- Religion and science - regarding deities and enlightenment
- Politics and justice - regarding polities and empowerment
- "Panautonomy" - all self-ruled.
- Panautotheism (all is God; all are 'gods'):
- [TODO: reorganize this into god/church/priests/enlightenment. With no legitimate god, there is no legitimate church; instead, everyone is the "church", and its "priests" are only so by degree of enlightenment].
- The very concept of an entity beyond the universe is invalid; as per the metaphysics earlier, the truth, and thus the object of reason, just consists in universally observable phenomena; and there is thus no legitimate reason to accept the existence of such entities as an abstract god purportedly above and beyond the universe. Some may argue that the existence of such a god can be proven by definition, arguing that the perfect being is defined in part by existence, and as such necessarily exists. However, as per the earlier stated epistemological limits on establishing facts from definition, one cannot define any arbitrary entity into being.
- "Gods" composed of parts of the universe are possible, but are not legitimate gods. Some may argue that the existence of such an entity is neccesary to explain the creation of the universe, but the same question can then be pushed back to such a god; what created it? As such a question can be asked indefinitely, the only solution is to accept that there is no ultimate first cause; only an infinite web of mutual causation. ("Creation" is the act of making some state of affairs true).
- The only thing that could legitimately be "God" is the universe itself - and the universe could fulfill all the functions usually attributed to God. But unless the universe is perfectly united into a single cohesive mind, then such a legitimate universal god does not exist. Because such unity is such an unlikely state of affairs - and because if it does in fact obtain, doing so will necessarily serve such a god anyway, everyone's individual mind being cohesive with such a universal god's mind by definition - it is best to assume that every individual must do his or her part as one of many surrogate deities on behalf of the hypothetical one true god, "the universe", though with overlapping jurisdictions, none of them can be true "gods" in the classical sense.
- The closest possible approximation to the mind of such a universal god will then emerge from the aggregate effects of such behavior; though it does not therefrom follow that beliefs of the majority represent the greatest truth, for minority opinions may still represent relevant but neglected perspectives, and so should not be discarded simply in favor of the opinion of the majority.
- Scientists - that is to say those who fastidiously apply critical empirical realism to compare different proposed theories and figure out which implies the most truth - are the universe's natural priests, and all it takes to be a successful scientist is to be enlightened.
- Enlightenment is the state of the mind being (or the process it of becoming) fully conscious or self-aware and self-critical. You cannot enlighten someone just by telling them facts, even if they're asking you for facts which will enlighten them; for enlightenment is not a set of beliefs but a mode of operation of the mind. You cannot simply tell them to operate their mind in that way either, for there is a bootstrapping problem there; they couldn't do that unless they were already enlightened to begin with. Instead, you must somehow inspire them to exercise their mind, give them - both in fact and just as importantly in their perception - opportunity and motive to think for themselves of their own accord. It will of course take much of such inspiration for such enlightenment to stick permanently.
- Panautocratism (everyone together is the State; every single individual is a 'state'):
- [TODO: reorganize this into state/government/governors/empowerment. With no legitimate state, there is no legitimate government; instead, everyone is the "government", and its "governors" are only so by degree of empowerment].
- The very concept of an authority beyond the people is invalid; as per the metaethics earlier, the good, and thus the object of duty, just consists in popularly pleasurable phenomena; and there is thus no legitimate duty to obey the commands of such authorities as an abstract state purportedly above and beyond the people. Some may argue that the authority of such a state can be established by contract, arguing that a political body is contracted into a position of authority, and as such is owed certain obligations. However, as per the earlier stated deontological limits on establishing duties by contract, one cannot contract any arbitrary authority into being.
- "States" composed of parts of the people are possible, but are not legitimate states. Some may argue that the authority of such an entity is neccesary to maintain governance and order amongst the people, but the same question can then be pushed back to such a state; who governs it? As such a question can be asked indefinitely, the only solution is to accept that there is no ultimate high authority; only an infinite web of mutual authority. ("Governance" is the act of making some state of affairs good).
- The only thing that could legitimately be "the state" is the people themselves - and the people could fulfill all the functions usually attributed to the state. But unless the people are perfectly united into a single cohesive will, then such a legitimate popular state does not exist. Because such unity is such an unlikely state of affairs - and because if it does in fact obtain, doing so will necessarily serve such a state anyway, everyone's individual will being necessarily cohesive with such a popular state's will - it is best to assume that every individual person must do his or her part as one of many surrogate polities on behalf of the hypothetical one true state, "the people", though with overlapping jurisdictions, none of them can be true "states" in the classical sense.
- The closest possible approximation to the will of such a popular state will then emerge from the aggregate effects of such behavior; though it does not therefrom follow that intentions of the majority represent the greatest good, for minority opinions may still represent relevant but neglected perspectives, and so should not be discarded simply in favor of the opinion of the majority.
- Mediators - that is to say those who fastidiously apply liberal hedonistic morality to compare different proposed strategies and figure out which implies the most good - are the people's natural governors, and all it takes to be a successful mediator is to be empowered.
- Empowerment is the state of the will being (or the process of it becoming) fully free or self-directed and self-controlled. You cannot empower someone just by telling them what to do, even if they are asking what to do to be empowered; for empowerment is not a set of actions but a mode of operation of the will. You cannot simply tell them to operate their will in that way either, for there is a bootstrapping problem there; they couldn't do that unless they were already empowered to begin with. Instead, you must somehow inspire them to exercise their will, give them - both in fact and just as importantly in their perception - opportunity and motive to take the initiative of their own accord. It will of course take much of such inspiration for such empowerment to stick permanently.
Aesthetics and Poetics
- Mysticism and Romanticism help inspire enlightenment and empowerment, respectively.
- While reason is the correct adherence to abstract rules of thought, mysticism goes beyond (but not against) reason to the unmediated, undifferentiated appreciation of the beauty of the world.
- While duty is the correct adherence to abstract rules of action, romanticism goes beyond (but not against) duty to the unmediated, undifferentiated appreciation of the drama of the world.
- Beauty is elegance; consistency amidst complexity. Drama is heroics; positivity amidst gravity.
- Appreciate the beauty and elegance of the world, don't just analyze it.
- Make your life not only just, but full of love and heroics.
- The world is a great work of art, and life is a great adventure.

Notation	English Reading	Abbreviation
`of(0\|P)`	"None (or zero) of the following: P" "Not P" (negation, "NOT")	`not(P)`
`of(0\|(P\|Q\|R))`	"None (or zero) of the following: P, Q, R" "Neither P, nor Q, nor R" (joint denial, "NOR")	`none-of(P\|Q\|R)`
`not(none-of(P\|Q\|R))`	"Some (not none) of the following: P, Q, R" "Either P or Q or R" (disjunction, "OR")	`some-of(P\|Q\|R)`
`none-of(not(P)\|not(Q)\|not(R))`	"None (or zero) of the following: not-P, not-Q, not-R" "All of the following: P, Q, R" "P and Q and R" (conjunction, "AND")	`all-of(P\|Q\|R)`
`not(all-of(P\|Q\|R))`	"Not all of the following: P, Q, R" "Some (not none) of the following: not-P, not-Q, not-R". "Not-P or not-Q or not-R" (alternate denial, "NAND")	`nall-of(P\|Q\|R)`
`all-of(some-of(P\|R\|Q)\|nall-of(P\|Q\|R))`	"Some but not all of the following: P, Q, R" (exclusive disjunction, "XOR")	`xome-of(P\|Q\|R)`
`some-of(all-of(P\|R\|Q)\|none-of(P\|Q\|R))`	"Either all of none of the following: P, Q, R" (mutual implication, "IFF")	`aon-of(P\|Q\|R)`
`not(some-of(not(P)\|Q))`	"If P then Q", or "P only if Q", or "Q if P" "Not neither not-P nor Q", "Either Q or not-P" (material implication, "IF-THEN")	`if(P\|Q)`

The Codex

by Forrest Cameranesi

Part I

Metaphilosophy

The Fundamentalist vs The Nihilist

The Universalist vs The Relativist

Axiomatization

Part II

Logic and Semantics

Notation

Junction

Variables

Context

Precision

Quantification

Qualification

Mood

Objects - Reality and Morality

Ontology, Alethology, or Metaphysics — and Teleology, Axiology, or Metaethics

Phenomenal Objectivism

Subjects - The Mind and the Will

Methods - Knowledge and Justice

Institutes - Religion and Politics

Aesthetics and Poetics

Questions? Comments?

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