HOME | BOOKS/BOOKLETS | THE MAGAZINE
SITE MAP | EMAIL

CONTENTS | PREVIOUS | NEXT

PAGE 35

THE teaching of Jesus on divorce was closely connected with Jewish thought in his day, and this in turn reflected differences in the interpretation of Deut. 24:1-4. It is necessary therefore to look at this passage before turning to the gospel records of Christ's words.

The R.V., which is not vitally different from the A.V., reads as follows:

"When a man taketh a wife, and marrieth her, then it shall be, if she find no favour in his eyes, because he hath found some unseemly thing in her (marg.: Heb. matter of nakedness), that he shall write her a bill of divorcement, and give it in her hand, and send her out of his house. And when she is departed out of his house, she may go and be another man's wife. And if the latter husband hate her, and write her a bill of divorcement, and give it in her hand, and send her out of his house; or if the latter husband die, which took her to be his wife; her former husband, which sent her away, may not take her again to be his wife, after that she is defiled; for that is abomination before the Lord."

This translation resolves the words of Moses into two commandments: (1) that if a man found "some unseemly thing" in the woman he had married he should give her a

PAGE 36

bill of divorcement, and (2) that in the event of the divorced wife marrying again, it was impossible for her to return to her first husband, even though the second husband had died. Even if the above translation is correct it is clear that the law was designed to deter divorce. The woman could not be put away without certain legal formalities, and after divorcing a woman a man could not take her again to be his wife. The regulations would prevent hasty action, and give time for reflection concerning the irrevocableness of the action. Moses does not define the procedure in preparing the bill of divorcement, but it is certain that later legislation made divorce a difficult and protracted process in which a rabbi had to exhaust every expedient to persuade husband and wife from proceeding to divorce, so that if possible reconciliation should be achieved. Presumably from the first the "writing" would have to be prepared by recognized "elders", and the later legislation probably reflected the earlier usage.

The accuracy of the translation of both A.V. and R.V., however, appears to be open to question. The American Jewish Translation reads as follows:

"When a man taketh a wife, and marrieth her, then it cometh to pass, if she find no favour in his eyes, because he hath found some unseemly thing in her, that he writeth her a bill of divorcement, and giveth it in her hand, and sendeth her out of his house, and she departeth out of his house, and goeth and becometh another man's wife, and the latter husband hateth her, and writeth her a bill of divorcement, and giveth it in her hand, and sendeth her out of his house; or of the latter husband die, who took her to be his wife; her former husband, who sent her away, may not take her again to be his wife, after that she is defiled, for that is an abomination before the Lord."

PAGE 37

This translation is supported by scholars generally. The Speaker's Commentary gives the rendering: "If a man hath taken a wife . . . and given her a bill of divorcement; and (verse 2) if she has departed out of his house and become another man's wife; and (verse 3) if the latter husband hate her, then (verse 4) her former husband may not take her again." The attached note declares that the "A.V. is undoubtedly wrong in placing a full stop at the end of verse 1 and verse 2. The four verses form only one sentence . . . thus verse 4 lays down the law on the case. So the LXX, and the large majority of commentators. It is thus evident that Moses neither institutes nor enjoins divorce."

To this might be added the words of Dr. J. H. Hertz, the late Chief Rabbi, who, in the Pentateuch and Haftorahs, says: "What we have here is no law instituting or commanding divorce. This institution is taken for granted, as in Lev. 21:7 and Num. 30:10. We are merely given one regulation in regard to it; viz., that a man who has divorced his wife may not remarry her, if her second husband divorced her or died."

Thus, in this revised translation, the passage does not enjoin divorce: the law required that divorce must be accompanied by a proper legal instrument, and it stipulated that a divorce was irreparable. In two ways the woman was protected: she was not to be the victim of any passing whim of a hasty-tempered man; and she remained a person and was not debased to the level of a thing that could be bandied about at the caprice of a man she had married.

The law which was designed for the protection of the woman was perverted by man. As the law of "an eye for

PAGE 38

eye" which was an inculcation of equity, was perverted into a title for full retaliation, so with the divorce law. What was an accommodation to human practice but restricting the worst abuses, was regarded by man as a law giving him the right to repudiate his wife.

This law of divorce was a subject hotly debated in Christ's day. Through the teaching of Hillel and Shammai two interpretations of Deut. 24 were current. In these interpretations Dr. Hertz declares that "the words of the Sacred Text were merely the pegs upon which to hang conflicting theories of life on the part of the disputants. The school of Shammai maintained that a marriage could be dissolved only by unchastity on the part of the wife, because adultery sapped the foundation of marriage and made its continuance impossible. The school of Hillel argued that divorce should be permitted for any reason which entailed a rupture of domestic harmony resulting in a daily violation of one of the main purposes of marriage-companionship. When Jesus was asked what he thought about divorce the question, as we shall see, was a reflection of these contentions.

The school of Shammai, while commendably opposed to the laxities permitted by the rival school, was nevertheless wrong in its interpretation of Deuteronomy 24. This is evident from the fact that other commandments of the law dealt with marital unfaithfulness and clearly defined the penalties for the transgression. The law was stern: "The man that committeth adultery with another man's wife, even he that committeth adultery with his neighbour's wife, the adulterer and adulteress shall surely be put to death" (Lev. 20:10). This law was repeated in Deut. 22:22: "They shall both of them die ... so shalt thou put away the evil from Israel."

PAGE 39

Several other laws touched upon the subject in one way or another. There were circumstances in which divorce was absolutely forbidden: if a man wrongly accused the woman he married of not being a virgin, he had to pay a sum of money to the parents, and the woman "shall be his wife; he may not put her away all his days" (Deut. 22:19). But if his accusation proved true the woman had to die by stoning (verses 20, 21).

A wife accused of unfaithfulness by a jealous husband could be subjected to the ordeal of trial by "the waters of bitterness" (Numbers 5) and if found guilty had to bear her iniquity. A slave wife, bought with money, had the rights of food, raiment, and duty of marriage, and if these were withheld the woman could go free (Exod. 21:10-11). It was forbidden a priest to marry a divorced woman (Lev. 21:7). Betrothal was binding and an espoused woman who was unfaithful had to be stoned with her seducer (Deut. 22:24); but if a defenceless woman was assaulted the man only had to die (verse 25). A man who seduced a woman not betrothed had to make her his wife without any rights of "putting her away all her days" (verses 28, 29).

These stringent regulations dealt with the "social evil" in a drastic way; but in the light of them we see that the "unseemly thing" for which divorce was permitted in Deuteronomy 24 could not be unchastity. The further fact that there is a reference to the second husband putting her away because he "hated" her similarly excludes unchastity and shows that other causes of divorce were in view. The Shammaites also dealt with the text in a questionable way: for Moses wrote "some unseemly thing" or "nakedness of a thing" (erwath dabar): but "for some undiscovered ground",

PAGE 40

Dr. R. H. Charles says they transposed these words; in the words of Dr. F. H. Chase:

"The school of Shammai, laying stress on the word, nakedness', decided that nothing but unchastity on the wife's part justified divorce. On the other hand, the school of Hillel, throwing the emphasis on the word 'thing' -- 'nakedness of a thing' and on the clause 'if she find no favour in his eyes', allowed divorce for trivial reasons -- e.g., if a woman burned her husband's food, or if he found another woman who pleased him better. It ought, however, to be added that there is no evidence that these were regarded as other than paradoxical sayings, or that they affected the actual life of the Jews."

We may sum up, then, that the law of Moses taught:

(1) That unfaithfulness on the part of husband or wife was to be punished with death.

(2) That a betrothed person guilty of unfaithfulness had to suffer death.

(3) That in some circumstances divorce was absolutely forbidden.

(4) That the law in Deut. 24:1-5 did not command divorce, but permitted it, at the same time safeguarding the interest of the woman in a way that deterred divorce being sought by the husband. Since other laws required that unfaithfulness in a married or betrothed person should be punished with death, the "unseemly thing" in Deut. 24:1 did not refer to sexual sin but to other things which custom treated as sufficient ground for a man divorcing his wife.

PAGE 41

(5) The interpretation of the school of Shammai of these verses was not correct (although, as we shall find, their stricter attitude came near to that laid down by Jesus, yet his teaching did not follow theirs on the verses in question).

(6) The school of Hillel as against that of Shammai, were correct in their interpretation of the verses, but, while it may be difficult to define what Moses intended exactly, it would appear that Hillel's followers were wrong in permitting so great a freedom for divorce on the basis of that interpretation.

(7) A woman divorced on the ground of Deut. 24:1 was yet at liberty to marry another man, and the latter is described as "husband" equally with the man she first married.

CONTENTS | PREVIOUS | NEXT